I. Introduction
The enforcement of international law by national courts carries great promise for the enhancement of international norms. International fora have limited competence to adjudicate international disputes, and States are reluctant to resolve disputes through judicial procedures. Thus, as Professor Henry Schermers observed 'If we want questions of international law to come before courts, then we should allow individuals to raise them.'
3 Until an international court to which individuals may appeal is established, national courts can potentially offer the best fora for judicial application of international law, since they are easily accessible by individuals, and their decisions can be readily executed. 4 Aside from the settlement of disputes.
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a procedure similar to the one provided by Article 177 of the EEC treaty, 8 were not pursued.
What are the causes of the limitations on the courts' independence in matters impinging on foreign affairs? Who initiated the limitations: the Legislature, the Executive, or the Court? Why? Do they reflect judicial ignorance, or rather a strategy of deference? I submit that these limitations are not a coincidence, but rather a reflection of an inherent deficiency in the structure of national courts. A comparative survey shows that these limitations are not accidental.' Their root may be found by analysing the position of the court within the State apparatus.
Sociologists of law examine the sensitive role of the judiciary in a democracy. The judiciary answers the needs of citizens who look to it for the resolution of disputes, and for the correction of problems resulting from the under-representation in the democratic process of minorities and other groups. 10 However, the value of the judiciary should also be examined from the perspective of the other branches of governments in the State apparatus. As pointed out by Roger Cotterrell, the courts are crucial in ensuring governmental interest in maintaining the stability of the social and political order. They do so, 'first, by providing legal frameworks and legal legitimacy for government and government acts and, secondly, by maintaining the integrity of the legal order itself -the ideological conditions upon which legal domination depends'. 11 The independence granted to the court by the other branches, and in particular the power of judicial review of governmental and legislative action, are at the same time a concession granted to the judiciary in return for its legitimating effect on the executive and the legislature, and a necessary condition for the judiciary's credibility in the eyes of the public. 12 
Eyal Bcnvcnisti
While in the domestic sphere all branches of government stand to gain from judicial independence and judicial review, the situation is different with respect to foreign affairs. In this sphere, the political branches of government do not have the same interest in impartial judicial scrutiny of their policies. As opposed to their interests in proving the legitimacy of the national legal system, to which they are responsible, the political branches have no incentive to bestow legitimacy on the international legal system, in which their State is only one actor among numerous actors, many of whom do not face judicial restrictions. Their only interest is the judicial vindication of their action abroad.
13 Whereas the government tolerates its own litigation losses in the domestic sphere, since these very defeats prove the overall soundness of the national legal system, it has no interest in a defeat in the courtroom in the name of the international legal order. Coinciding with this governmental interest is the limited public demand for the legitimacy of the international legal process. Since individuals qua individuals do not enjoy access to international fora, and have little opportunity to participate in shaping international law, the courts do not serve the function of protecting such access, a function that legitimizes their intervention in the domestic plane. 16 Faced with an unenthusiastic governmental attitude towards judicial scrutiny over foreign affairs and the limited demand of the public, die judiciary has no leverage to negotiate a grant of power to review and must succumb to the restriction of its powers. The pact is thus dictated to the court, and not, as Franck suggests, offered as 'giveback' by the court.
17
Judges, however, readily accept this dictate. From their point of view, this restriction of their powers protects the judiciary against intense confrontations with the government or with public opinion. Were a court to decide against the government in a foreign affairs matter, officials may refuse to comply, and the government may even restrict the court's jurisdiction. In addition, such decisions could expose the judges to the official and public critique of jeopardizing national interests and assisting enemies and rivals. This analysis indicates that judicial timidity at the national level in foreign affairs can only be overcome by an accepted systemic remedy, such as the establishment of an Article 177-like procedure.
18 But the approach of the Resolution is different It offers tools for eliminating the symptoms of the problem, for example by abolishing the political question or the act-of-state doctrines, as if Court's earliest years', and continues to describe 'Marshall's rmdinnt to bargain away some illdefined degree of judicial review over foreign affairs'. Ibid, at 11. 
IV. The Contents of the Resolution

A. Generally: Striking a Tone Too Mild
The Resolution advances the idea that the role of the national judiciary should be strengthened vis-cl-vis the other branches of government 'in order to attain within each State a correct application of international law '. 28 Recognizing that such a goal may be achieved only through common agreement, the Resolution is addressed to all three branches of government. The Resolution offers bold suggestions for the strengthening of the independence of the courts, yet it formulates these suggestions as recommendations and concedes that each State is entitled to decide on what are 'the most appropriate ways and means for ensuring that international law is applied at the national level'.
29 This watered-down formulation 30 reflects the differing views of the drafters.
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The recognition of joint responsibility of all branches of government to the application of international law, rather than judges' particular responsibility, sustains judges' inclination to defer to the executive as the most suitable organ to meet this responsibility. Yet a violation of international law may result from the misapplication of international law by judges as much as by odier State officials.
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Many judges tend to ignore this principle, since they do not have to execute their own judgments. The Resolution provided the appropriate occasion to remind judges of their own responsibility in reaching decisions incompatible with international law. The 'diplomatic' style of the Resolution fails to make such an emphasis.
B. The List of Principles
The seven Articles of the Resolution aim at obliterating doctrines that have been developed by courts to shield themselves from applying international law. 33 For the purpose of this comment, the Articles may be grouped into two categories: (a) the call for independent and impartial interpretation of international law and international facts; and (b) the rejection of the avoidance doctrines of the political question and the act of State. emphasizes, however, that those facts gathered and presented by the executive are only prima facie evidence in court After the facts have been established, the Resolution states that courts should be free to interpret the legal meaning of those facts, or in the words of Article 7(3), 'the legal characterization of the facts should be reserved for the judiciary alone*. The distinction between facts and law is more complicated than the Resolution seems to imply. Many 'facts' are based on legal assumptions. Indeed, the criteria for the establishment of many 'facts', like statehood, or aggression, are legal, not factual ones. Having deferred to the executive's judgment as to the existence of such a 'fact', the court could yield to the executive's interpretation of the law. Thus, without a clear distinction between 'international facts' and their legal characterization, the call in Article 7 for courts to consider the executive's 'findings' as prima facie evidence must be emphasized.
Independent and Impartial Interpretation of International Law and International Facts
(b) Discharging the Duty of Independence in Practice
Having established that national courts should interpret and apply international law independently, 'basing themselves on the methods followed by international tribunals' (Article 1(3)), the Resolution addresses the following questions: May the courts contribute to the transformation of customary international law (Article 4)? May courts determine independently whether a treaty is valid or not, or no longer valid (Articles 5(1) and 5(2))? May courts determine the existence or content of general principles of law and binding resolutions of international organizations (Article 6)? The answer to all of these questions is in the affirmative. In a sense, these answers could have been deduced from the principle mentioned in Article 1(2), namely that courts should utilize the same methods of inquiry used by international tribunals. Thus, Articles 4, 5 and 6 serve mainly to emphasize the call for independent interpretation and application by national courts.
The issue of courts' determination of a treaty's validity raises a further question concerning the law of treaties. When grounds to terminate or invalidate a treaty arise, do they automatically invalidate or terminate the treaty without a formal act of denunciation (or an equivalent act)? If the answer is yes, then judges could declare the status of a treaty, without the need to refer to formal acts. The Resolution does not enter into this debate. Instead, it relies on the findings of Conforti and Labella concerning the performance of national courts in this context 39 After a thorough survey of legal literature, these authors concluded that national courts have largely asserted their power to declare treaties invalid or terminated when no formal denunciation was made, even in matters that require such a denunciation to invalidate or terminate a treaty. 40 Couits have followed a formal denunciation when such was issued by their State (but not by other States).
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The impressive collection of court decisions actively engaged in analysing treaties, as presented and appraised by Conforti and Labella, might seem incompatible with the generally hesitant attitude of judges towards international law. Note however that the authors do not suggest that these courts overlooked national interests. An inquiry into whether in making these decisions courts diverged from their tendency to favour such interests requires an examination of the circumstances of each case and the consequences of each decision. Indeed, my own survey of the behaviour of a large number of national courts in cases relating to the application of the law of belligerent occupation, 42 showed that despite a seemingly independent application of the international law of occupation, 43 courts manipulated the law to reach outcomes that accommodated national interests. Conforti and Labella's description of a number of cases suggests that a similar deferential attitude inspired at least some of the outcomes. 44 As Conforti and Labella concede, in reference to the decision of the District Court of the Hague of 20 May 1986, 45 which refused to examine the validity of a treaty regarding the installation of US cruise missiles in The Netherlands, there are limits to judicial independence in such matters. 46 In the light of such concerns, it would be preferable to look to the law of treaties for defining the proper role of national courts in determining the status of treaties, rather than entrusting the courts the task of defining their own competence in this matter, as the Resolution recommends (Articles 1(3), 5(3) ).
The Rejection of Prudential Doctrines
The Resolution addresses the two major judicially created doctrines that have proved high hurdles on the road to judicial application of international law. Yet the two doctrines should not be treated similarly. While the abolition of the foreign act of State doctrine is justified, the rejection of the political question doctrine is quite problematic. In addition to the Resolution's recommendation regarding these two doctrines, I shall discuss a third hurdle, which was not addressed by the Resolution. abolish the doctrine altogether. At least with respect to the Resolution, his effort has proved a success. 54 In fact, the Resolution takes Franck's suggestion a crucial step further. Whereas Franck also suggests permitting courts to establish special executive-minded evidentiary rules, 55 the Resolution does not approve such preferential treatment.
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The call to abolish the political question doctrine garners support from the assumption that this doctrine is not as pervasive in non-common law jurisdictions. However, in French law one finds the doctrine of actes de gouvernement, which recognizes that the government has an unfettered prerogative of action in the sphere of international relations. 57 As discussed in Conforti's Report, this doctrine is similar to the political question doctrine.
58 While the German Constitutional Court does not recognize any of these doctrines -in fact, Franck's argument that we can and should do without this doctrine, relies on the German jurisprudence 59 -the German Court finds other avenues for negotiating possible conflicts between international law and national interests. 60 The preoccupation of common law judges with deferring to the executive so that their country can speak in international fora with a single voice 61 is shared, as Franck shows, also by the German judges.
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The Resolution's suggestion to abolish this doctrine underestimates the forces that impelled courts to devise it It must be recognized that sometimes, in difficult encounters between the executive and the court, judges must defer to the executive. In such situations judges must choose the lesser evil between the two: misapplication of the law, or abstention, through a reliance on the political question doctrine. I suggest that the first alternative, which necessarily entails a distortion of tbe law, is not a legitimate exercise of judicial power. It also sanctions an illegality to be used by the executive on other, less dramatic, occasions. An example of the consequences of a courts' choice of the first alternative, the misapplication of the law, is the case in which the Israeli High Court of Justice was requested to review the deportations of 415 Islamic fundamentalists suspected of being members of terrorist groups from the occupied territories. 64 The litigation attracted enormous attention, both in Israel and throughout the world Yet despite the difficult political situation it faced, the Court did not opt for silence. The unanimous decision of the unusually large panel of seven judges did not examine the legality of the deportation orders under international law. 65 Instead, the Court held that in Israeli administrative law the right to be heard (audi alterem partem) prior to the deportation, as provided by the local law, may be qualified due to overriding security considerations. As a consequence of the Court's effort to vindicate the deportation orders, the general right to be heard in administrative proceedings suffered an unnecessarily severe setback. By choosing the second alternative -abstention through the use of the political question doctrine -the Court could have avoided the misapplication of the law, and the blow to the principle of audi alterem partem).
Given the inescapable deference of national courts to the executive, the Resolution's rejection of the political question doctrine represents a choice for the occasional misapplication of international law by national courts. There is much to be said against this choice, especially in light of the Resolution's expectation that national courts will assume a larger role in the development of international law. If courts in various jurisdictions take the route suggested by the Resolution, we should anticipate more outcomes such as the decision that deportations from occupied territories are not illegal, or that individuals have no standing to sue against violations of international law.
66 Soon enough we would encounter cross-references between jurisdictions, each court entrenching the other's prior misapplication of the law, thus producing an executive-oriented jurisprudence that initially would purport to be, but later would become, evidence of customary international law. Lawyers who strive to protect international standards of human rights should explore the second alternative, as the flawed but better option in hard cases.
This second option, abstention, entails further choices: a declaration of the law without requiring compliance, judicial silence, or a middle course that may take the form of creative obiter dicta or even a deliberately wrong statement of the facts of the case. The first choice is advocated by Franck, 67 and indeed, there is much to be said in its favour. Declaratory judgments, suggests Franck, 'make it possible to reconcile pragmatically the obligation to say what the law is with [judges'] duty not to cripple the political branches in their task of defending the national interests against foreign adversaries.' 68 As this option presumes reduced political pressure on the judge, one could expect a faithful interpretation of the law. This option, however, underestimates the extra-judicial effect of a judicial pronouncement portraying governmental action as illegal. Where such effects are to be expected, and are conceived as contrary to national interests, judges could either opt for a declaration on the law in the abstract, without entering into factual assessments, or simply resort to silence, by invoking the political question doctrine.
A silent court, objects Michael Glennon, promotes disorder, for judicial nondecision of a bona fide case or controversy deprives litigants as well as future actors of ... knowledge of the roles they must live by, undermines predictability in public affairs and maTimirai chaos.69
But judicial abstention does not undermine predictability, for no matter which option the court takes -abstention or (mis)application of the law -the immediate outcome of the litigation of hard cases will usually be the same: the rejection of the petition against the government 70 In other words, the existence of the doctrine does not significantly circumscribe the scope of potential judicial review. Instead, it inspires a vital and candid public debate over the proper limits of judicial review. Invoking the political question doctrine is a highly visible move that exposes the court to public scrutiny much more than a pro-government misapplication of the law. A judicial resort to the political question doctrine could convey to the public a strong message of disapproval of a certain act It stops short of legitimising the act, and thus relegates the issue to be resolved by public debate. Judges who hesitate to expose the limits of their power prolong a myth of broad judicial powers but in the end play into the hands of the executive, and produce bad international law.
It is conceded that the scope of the political question doctrine does not lend itself to satisfactory textual definition.
71 But contrary to lawyers' instincts, an effort to define more clearly the scope of this doctrine would be counterproductive: It is preferable that the government remain with doubts regarding its area of 'free reign', and at the same time, that litigants remain hopeful regarding the prospects of their appeaL The scope of the doctrine will be reexamined constantly in and outside of the courtroom.
The Resolution, in Article 2, does not always require national courts to issue injunctions. The recommendation that courts 'not decline competence on the basis of the political nature of the question' leaves to the judges enough discretion to select the refined remedy most suitable under the specific circumstances. The above analysis shows that the optimal remedy is not necessarily the more assertive one. Even those who prefer to supply the courts with prudential doctrines would not insist on the retention of the Act of State doctrine. Whenever courts find it prudent to abstain they have other, more appropriate tactics, like the political question doctrine, at their disposal. 80 The rejection by the Resolution of the Act of State doctrine is therefore a noteworthy step towards its eradication. The drafters of the Resolution were probably quite confident that most courts acknowledge this principle, and take up private challenges to acts under international law. Yet, in light of recent US case-law to the contrary, 85 an affirmative statement on the issue of standing was in place.
V. Conclusion
The Resolution addresses a very complex issue. An effective network of national courts applying international law could contribute immensely to the enhancement of the law. It is time that judges be called upon to recognize their duty to implement international law. However, the invitation to judges to join in the process of international lawmaking should take into consideration the judges' sensitive position within the State apparatus. One should not expect judges to divorce themselves entirely from internal power struggles and public opinion. It is extremely difficult to reduce this inherent conflict to a number of concise statements, as the Resolution sets out to do. Faced with this challenge, its drafter chose to emphasize the courts' duties rather than the difficulties they face. Yet the drafters were fully aware that these difficulties would continue to shape courts' decisions.
It is to be hoped that the call of the Institut will not be lost on litigants and courts. For the academics among us, the Resolution is a good opportunity to refine our positions on the perennial question of defining the proper role of national courts in the international legal system. 
